The power of technology to transform religions, science, and political institutions has often been presented as nothing short of revolutionary. Does technology have a similarly transformative influence on societies’ morality? Scholars have not rigorously investigated the role of technology in moral revolutions, even though existing research on technomoral change suggests that this role may be considerable. In this paper, we explore what the role of technology in moral revolutions, understood as processes of radical group-level moral change, amounts to. We do (...) so by investigating four historical episodes of radical moral change in which technology plays a noteworthy role. Our case-studies illustrate the plurality of mechanisms involved in technomoral revolutions, but also suggest general patterns of technomoral change, such as technology’s capacity to stabilize and destabilize moral systems, and to make morally salient phenomena visible or invisible. We find several leads to expand and refine conceptual tools for analysing moral change, specifically by crystallizing the notions of ‘technomoral niche construction’ and ‘moral payoff mechanisms’. Coming to terms with the role of technology in radical moral change, we argue, enriches our understanding of moral revolutions, and alerts us to the depths of which technology can change our societies in wanted and unwanted ways. (shrink)

Ongoing serious breaches in medical professionalism can only be avoided if UK doctors rethink their approach to law. UK medical education has a role in creating a climate of change by re-examining how law is taught to medical students. Adopting a more insightful approach in the UK to the impact of The Human Rights Act and learning to manipulate legal concepts, such as conflict of interest, need to be taught to medical students now if UK doctors are to manage complex (...) decision-making in the NHS of the future. The literature is reviewed from a unique personal perspective of a doctor and lawyer, and practical proposals for developing medical education in law in the UK are suggested. (shrink)

Recent scholarship on technology-induced ‘conceptual disruption’ has spotlighted the notion of a conceptual gap. Conceptual gaps have also been discussed in scholarship on epistemic injustice, yet up until now these bodies of work have remained disconnected. This article shows that ‘gaps’ of interest to both bodies of literature are closely related, and argues that a joint examination of conceptual disruption and epistemic injustice is fruitful for both fields. I argue that hermeneutical marginalization—a skewed division of hermeneutical resources, which serves to (...) diminish the experiences of marginalized folk—does not only transpire because of conceptual gaps, but also because of two other kinds of conceptual disruption: conceptual overlaps and conceptual misalignments. Hence, there are multiple kinds of conceptual disruption that can be usefully studied through the normative lens of epistemic injustice. Technology can play different roles vis-a-vis epistemic injustices, both as a causal trigger of conceptual disruption, but also as a mediator of hermeneutical resources. Its role is normatively significant, in particular because socially disruptive technologies can have different epistemic implications for different groups: they may amplify the epistemic resources of some groups, while diminishing those of others. (shrink)

In two important articles, Thomas Hurka applies his recursive account of value to virtue. Hurka’s contention is that being virtuous is merely a matter of having the proper pro-attitude toward what is objectively good. Hurka argues that the recursive framework honors much of our traditional conception of virtue, and even if it does not capture everything involved in virtue, it “describes at least part of what virtue involves.” I argue that the recursive account of virtue is not a partial description (...) of traditional virtue, however, but a reconception of virtue. Accepting the recursive account would require abandoning the most distinctive elements of traditional virtue ethics. (shrink)

Virtue theory in philosophical bioethics has influenced clinical ethics with depictions of the virtuous doctor or nurse. Comparatively little has been done with the concept of the virtuous patient, however. Bioethicists should correct the asymmetry in virtue theory between physician virtues and patient virtues in a way that provides a practical theory for the new patient-centered medicine—something clinicians and administrators can take seriously.

Robert F. is an eighty-five-year-old who suffered a heart attack at home in a rural location some thirty minutes from any major hospital. By the time the paramedics arrived, he was unconscious and nonresponsive. After spontaneous return of circulation, they began their standard procedure of therapeutic hypothermia. Robert's core temperature was lowered using ice packs, and cold intravenous fluids were initiated. Soon afterward, Robert started to shiver when his body temperature reached 35.6° Celsius. He was then given a bolus of (...) vecuronium as a neuromuscular blockade, sedated, and intubated. He was also given a low-dose vasopressin for blood-pressure control. Shortly after Robert arrived in the emergency room, his daughter, his medical decision-maker, produced an advance directive documenting that her father has a do-not-resuscitate order, and she demanded that the breathing tube and any other life-sustaining treatments be withdrawn immediately. The medical staff is very reluctant to comply with this demand for immediate action. Until the neuromuscular blockade wears off, removing the ventilator will prevent Robert from breathing. Furthermore, it may take some time to reverse the therapeutic hypothermia procedure to the point that the patient is at normal temperature. In addition, therapeutic hypothermia itself often causes arrest, so the patient may need to be resuscitated again. Should the staff wait until the patient is warm or honor the decision of his daughter, who holds his medical power of attorney? (shrink)

It has been asserted that there is no one universal proposition with which all philosophers would agree, including this one. The pre dicament has rarely been recognized and almost never accepted, although neither has it been successfully challenged. If the claim holds true for philosophy taken by itself, how much more must it of religion, the hold for crossfield interests, such as the philosophy philosophy of science and many others. The philosophy of educa tion is a particular case in point. (...) The topic of education itself is generally regarded as a dull af fair, a charge not entirely without substance. The blame for this usually falls on the fact that it has no inherent subject matter. The teachers of history teach history, the teachers of biology teach biology; but what do the teachers of education teach? Presumably how to teach; but this simply will not do because every topic requires its own sort of instruction. (shrink)

On April 3, 1995, the Fourth Circuit upheld the right of a Maryland hospital to terminate a surgeon who was HIV-positive ). A resident in the University of Maryland Neurosurgical Training Program was dismissed when hospital administrators learned of his infection with HIV. The resident, known as Dr. Doe, claimed that his termination violated federal laws protecting persons with disabilities. The court upheld the hospital's actions as lawful and affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the hospital.Dr. Doe (...) charged that his dismissal from the training program violated the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. (shrink)

I take this opportunity of correcting a particularly reprehensible error of my own on p. 140 of my edition of these poems. At A.A. 1. 730 read ‘…hoc multri †non ualuisse† putant’; and at 11. 3-4 of the critical apparatus read ‘equidem multi utique’ eqs. In other words, the manuscripts are unanimous in offering multi. I hope that Dr. Lenz will be glad to have this evidence of our common humanity.